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Tax Progressivity and Self-Employment Dynamics
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Abstract
Analysis of the relationship between taxes and self-employment should ac-
count for the interplay between responses in self-employment and wage employ-
ment. To this end, we estimate a two-state multi-spell duration model which
accounts for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity using a large longitu-
dinal administrative dataset for Norway for 1993 to 2011. Our findings confirm
theoretical predictions, and are robust to various changes to definitions and sam-
ple selections. A policy experiment simulating a flatter tax schedule in the year
2000 is found to encourage self-employment, delivering a net increase of predicted
inflow into self-employment from 2.8% to 5.3%.
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1 Introduction
Models of choices facing wage earners typically neglect the fact that taxpayers may exit
or enter self-employment because of differences in tax schedules. Since the interplay between
the occupational choices is typically not considered in models of labour supply, these models
are silent on how tax differences across occupational choice affect decisions.1,2 However in
contrast, models of choice of the self-employed are dominated by perspectives where decisions
are based on implicit or explicit comparisons to the wage sectors. One obvious reason for
this asymmetry is the relative sizes of the sectors. For example, the self-employment rate
(as a percentage of total employment) in Norway is 7%, while the European Union average
is approximately 15% (OECD, 2018).
The relationship to the wage sector is not the only factor that complicates the assess-
ment of the effects of taxation on self-employment. From a theoretical perspective, the
tax effects are ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in the tax rate may diminish the
self-employment rate as it reduces expected returns. On the other hand, high taxes may
encourage self-employment if loss-offsetting is allowed, since the government provides an im-
plicit insurance by sharing the risk associated with self-employment (Domar and Musgrave,
1944).3
A large majority of empirical studies on the effect of taxes on the level of self-employment
activity focuses on the United States. These studies examine the extensive margin in occu-
pational choice models (see Bruce (2000, 2002), Gentry and Hubbard (2000, 2004), Schuetze
1 See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and Keane (2011) for reviews of the literature on labour
supply.
2 ‘Occupational choice’ here means a choice between wage-employment and self-employment.
3 The role of loss-offsetting is less clear in the presence of a progressive tax schedule. If the
tax rate is an increasing function of taxable income, the savings made because of the loss-
offset are usually lower in magnitude than the taxes paid on profits (Gentry and Hubbard,
2000).
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(2000), Schuetze and Bruce (2004), Cullen and Gordon (2007), and Moore (2004)).4 Studies
for other countries include, Hansson (2012) for Sweden; Fossen (2007, 2009), and Fossen and
Steiner (2009), for Germany, and Wen and Gordon (2014), for Canada. Results from these
studies are mixed. Results for the United States, for example, do not provide an unambigu-
ous answer about the relationship between tax progressivity and self-employment. However,
in other countries, tax progressivity is generally found to discourage self-employment.5
The representation of the tax schedule is important in any analysis of tax effects on
self-employment. Some studies include measures of marginal and/or average taxes in a
quasi-experimental or reduced-form analysis to investigate the effect of non-linearities in
4 See Hansson (2012), Gale and Brown (2013), and Clingingsmith and Shane (2016), for
surveys on taxation and self-employment.
5 A positive correlation between taxes and self-employment may also partly be attributed
to the higher tax evasion or avoidance possibilities in self-employment relative to wage
employment (see, for instance, Schuetze and Bruce (2004)). Our data do not allow us to
address this issue. Recent tax evasion estimates for Norway show that around 14% of the
business income is not reported (Nyg̊ard, Slemrod and Thoresen, 2019). This estimate
is lower than typical estimates for the U.S. but close to what is found among the self-
employed in Finland (Johansson, 2005), and Denmark (Kleven et al., 2011). Slemrod
(2007) estimates that around 57% of U.S. non-farm business income was not reported. The
time and individual unobservable effects included in our model will partially mitigate this
problem if the differential evasion possibilities are relatively constant over the time period
under consideration. Another issue is the possibility of a tax-induced organisational shift.
See Papini (2018) for a recent analysis of this issue. We treat a self-employed individual who
decides to incorporate, and thus, decides to earn wages from the company, as a wage earner.
We also include region fixed effects to partly control for this issue, as this organisational
shift was more common in some regions and time periods (Papini, 2018).
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taxes on entrepreneurship.6 In other studies, authors have used measures of expected net-
income differences and/or tax progressivity to capture the tax effects. For example, Gentry
and Hubbard (2000, 2004) use the spread in the marginal (or average) tax rates faced by a
self-employed individual at various levels of ‘success’, where success is defined as the observed
distribution of the three-year real wage growth for entrants into self-employment.
In two recent studies (Fossen, 2009; Wen and Gordon, 2014), authors derive the tax vari-
ables within a structural framework where the decision making is based on the difference in
expected utilities. Yet, the two papers differ in many aspects and draw different conclusions.
The use of different utility functions and assumptions regarding the pre-tax income distri-
bution of the individual result in different variables that capture the effects of nonlinearities
in the tax schedule. They also use different statistical models (logit vs. probit).
Fossen (2009) models the transitions between wage and self-employment using data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) over the period 2002 to 2006, and a logit model
in which agents are assumed to trade-off risks and returns. He uses a constant relative risk-
aversion utility, and assumes normally distributed pre-tax income. The two relevant model-
generated variables are: (i) the difference in net-of-tax incomes in the two occupations, and
(ii) the variances of the individual’s post-tax income distributions in the transition equation.
In contrast, Wen and Gordon (2014) use a pooled cross-sectional sample from the Cana-
dian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics over the years 1999 to 2005 to estimate the
probability of self-employment in a probit model.7 They assume risk neutrality and a log-
normal distribution for the pre-tax income. The relevant ‘tax variables’ are: (i) the difference
in log net-of-tax incomes in the occupations (netincdiff ), and (ii) a variable that they call con-
6 For example, Bruce (2002), and Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008) use expected marginal
tax rates, or, alternatively, average tax rates to capture non-linearities in the tax schedule.
These authors do not include any measure of riskiness of income received.
7 Thus, the focus is on being in self-employment at the time of interview, and not on entering
self-employment.
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vexity. The variable convexity has an intuitive interpretation as the ‘increase in tax-liability
taken on by the self-employed due to the volatility of their business income, expressed as a
proportion of their disposable income’.
Both studies use selectivity-corrected income equations to predict individual pre-tax in-
comes, and then use a tax-transfer micro-simulation model to generate the relevant expected
value and variance of after-tax incomes in wage employment and self-employment. The
estimated models are subsequently used to simulate the effects of hypothetical tax policy
scenarios that reduced progressivity. Fossen finds the ‘flatter-tax’ reforms considered dis-
courage individuals from choosing self-employment;8 Wen and Gordon find a ‘small’ positive
effect on the probability of finding someone in self-employment.9
Here we use the two variables netincdiff and convexity used by Wen and Gordon (2014).
Although some of the tax effects in both studies are captured via net-income differences, the
additional variable convexity in Wen and Gordon (2014) is an individual-specific measure
that intuitively captures the interaction between the progressivity of the tax schedule and
the volatility of self-employment income relative to wage income.
Our work complements the existing empirical literature in a number of ways. First, our
definitions of wage employment and self-employment are based on reported incomes from
tax records, and not on survey responses. We use data drawn from various Norwegian
population registers over the period 1993 to 2011. The data include rich socio-demographic
information together with highly accurate income measures from the annual tax returns.
Second, we model the evolution of employment spells using a two-state multi-spell duration
8 The interpretation given in Fossen (2009) is that a flatter tax schedule increases expected
returns in self-employment, but at the same time it also increases the risk, since the variance
of the net income distribution also increases. The second effect is found to dominate the
first one and hence, a flatter tax schedule discourages self-employment.
9 The ‘flatter-tax’ reform considered is found to increase the probability of finding someone
in self-employment by 0.04 percentage points, from the base model prediction of 5.76%.
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model that controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity correlated across spells, and
accounts for left and right censoring in the observed spells. This contrasts with several
previous contributions, which mainly focus on self-employment entries or exits using survey
data with self-reported employment status and short panels of individuals.
We generally find significant effects of both netincdiff and convexity on the probability of
exit from both types of employment spells, conforming to theoretical predictions as discussed
in Section 5.1. The increase in convexity is found to increase the probability of exiting self-
employment, and to decrease the probability of entry into self-employment, i.e., convexity
has a discouraging effect on self-employment, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, an opposite
effect is found for netincdiff : negative (positive) in the self-employment (wage-employment)
equation. Additionally, in our base model, we find a larger effect of convexity relative to
that of netincdiff, implying that small increases in convexity will require large increases in
netincdiff to discourage the self-employed from quitting, and to encourage wage earners to
enter self-employment.
Given the way the tax variables are constructed, a change in the progressivity of the
tax schedule will have an impact on the convexity and on the netincdiff by changing the
expected net income difference in self-employment and wage employment. From this, the
total effect on the rate of self-employment of a decrease in the progressivity of the tax
schedule is hard to predict. Hence, to better understand the net effect, we simulate a tax
experiment that replaces the personal income tax structure in the year 2000 with a less
progressive, revenue-neutral tax schedule, as explained in Section 5.2. The overall estimated
effect of this policy change is positive on the share of self-employment. The average exit
rate from self-employment is estimated to go down by 0.018 (s.e 0.184) percentage points,
while the estimated exit rate from wage-employment is estimated to increase by 0.119 (s.e
0.010) percentage points. This change results in a net increase of predicted inflow into
self-employment changing from about 2.8% to 5.3%.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the taxation of self-
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employment income and wages during our sample period. Section 3 sets out our econometric
model. In Section 4 we provide details of the data and the sample selected for our analyses.
We also present the procedure used for estimating the tax variables. The estimation results
are discussed in Section 5, along with the results from our policy simulation and some
sensitivity checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Taxation in Norway
Tax reforms undertaken in 1992 introduced a dual-income tax system in Norway. Under
this regime, all types of capital income are taxed at a flat rate, but a progressive schedule
applies to labour and pension income. Individuals pay income tax on two different tax bases:
(i) ordinary income, and (ii) personal income.
Income from wages, self-employment, capital, transfers, and pensions, are first grouped
as ordinary income. After deductions, individuals pay tax at a flat rate (28% during most of
the sample period) on ordinary income.10 The other tax base - personal income - includes
wage income, transfers and pension income, self-employment income due to active efforts,
but not capital income. Individuals pay a surtax and social security contributions levied on
the personal income.
As an example, consider a wage earner whose only source of income is from wages in the
year 2005. The solid line in Figure 1 represents the marginal tax rates that apply to the wage
income. No taxes and contributions are paid for income below the tax-free threshold. This
threshold was NOK 29,600 in 2005.11 Above the threshold, a social security contribution of
25% (of the personal income above NOK 29,600) is due, up to the amount where the total
amount is the same as one would get using the standard rate of 7.8% on all personal income.
Thereafter the rate is 7.8%. The flat tax on ordinary income (28% in 2005), is paid on the
10 The deductions include a standard personal allowance, a deduction for expenses, including
interest payments, and a basic allowance, which is a percentage (up to a maximum) of
labour or pension income.
11 The exchange rate in 2005 was: 1 USD≡6.45 NOK; 1 EUR ≡8.01 NOK).
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part of income that exceeds the sum of the personal allowance and the basic allowance. The
basic allowance is 31% of wage income with a lower limit of NOK 31,800 and an upper limit
of NOK 57,400. The personal allowance is a standard deduction from ordinary income, set
at NOK 34,200 in 2005. The last two steps in Figure 1 represent the two surtaxes that raise
the marginal tax rates by 12 percentage points and 15.5 percentage points. The maximum
marginal tax rate of 51.3% is reached after the two surtaxes become effective.
[Figure 1 here]
Taxation is more complicated for the self-employed because income represents the reward
to the labour of the individual, as well as the returns to the capital invested in the firm.
Given the lower tax rate on capital income, the decision about how to declare the income
was not left to the discretion of the self-employed; rules were established to split the profits
into labour and capital income.12 The dashed line in Figure 1 represents the marginal tax
rates that apply to self-employment income in the case where no capital is invested in the
firm. The main differences to the wage income case are the lack of basic allowance, and the
higher social security contribution (10.7% in 2005).
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
Tax progressivity is achieved through the tax-free allowances applied to ordinary income,
and the surtaxes on personal income. However, during the years under consideration, the
progressivity changed several times due to changes to the tax rates, to the number of surtaxes
and to their thresholds. Overall, tax progressivity decreased during the period. Figures 2
and 3 show the marginal tax rates and average tax rates in different years for an individual
whose only source of income was wage income.13 Marginal tax rates in the year 2010 were
12 Capital income is calculated by multiplying the capital invested in the firm with a rate of
return annually established by the government. The labour income is then estimated by
subtracting the imputed capital income from the reported self-employment income net of
expenses.
13 Note that the thresholds account for wage growth.
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overall lower than in the year 1995, and, for most part, they were also lower than in the year
2005. Similarly, the average tax rates in 1995 were in general higher than the rates in 2005
and 2010 (Figure 3).
3 Econometric model
Drawing heavily on the framework of Ham, Li and Shore-Sheppard (2016), we model
employment transitions using a two-state multi-spell discrete duration model accounting for
unobserved individual heterogeneity.14 The two employment states are self-employment and
wage employment. The duration variable is measured in terms of the Norwegian financial
year, which is the calendar year (January-December). Approximately 70% of individuals in
our sample have a first spell that is left censored. Without dropping these individuals from
the analysis sample, we include them and specify a different model of exit rates for them
(Ham, Li and Shore-Sheppard, 2016). We check for sensitivity of our estimates to excluding
the left-censored spells, which is equivalent to using an inflow sample.
With regard to the unobserved heterogeneity, we follow the literature and assume this to
be distributed independently across individuals and of the covariates included but fixed over
the same type of spell, but correlated across the two employment states and the type of spell
(fresh vs left-censored). A discrete distribution is assumed for the unobserved heterogeneity.
As we closely follow the setup in Ham, Li and Shore-Sheppard (2016), we provide only
the form of the hazard function used, and refer the readers to their paper for further details.
For notational simplicity, we do not distinguish between duration time and calendar time,
although the estimated model does. The duration time random variable is denoted as Υ.
14 Following the early pioneering work by Lancaster (1979), and Nickell (1979), the literature
on modelling durations using survival analysis has developed very fast. Lancaster (1990)
and Van den Berg (2001) provide a comprehensive discussion of theoretical issues as well
as empirical examples that helped to develop this literature. See Carrasco and Garca-
Prez (2015) for another recent application of a two-state multi-spell duration model with
discretely distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
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Let j = {sf, wf, sc, wc} where the first letter denotes a self-employment (s) or a wage-
employment (w) spell, and the second letter denotes a fresh (f) or a left-censored spell (c).
The probability that individual i would leave the spell in spell type j at the end of duration
time t, conditional on not having left in t− 1, is a discrete time hazard λ(t) given by:






j taxation i,j(t) + ωi,j
) (1)
where hj is the duration dependence function. xi,j(t) contains time-fixed and time-varying
observed individual characteristics, taxation contains the tax variable(s), and ωi,j is the
unobserved heterogeneity. F is specified as the complementary log-log distribution func-
tion.15 To achieve convergence with stable parameter estimates, we restrict the duration
dependence function to a log linear form, and model the unobserved heterogeneity to be
discrete with two points of support.16 We keep the hazard-specific intercepts, and set
15 The distribution function is given by F (z) = 1 − exp[− exp(z)]. Some other popular
distributions used are the standard normal and the logistic cdfs which are symmetric
distributions. The distribution we employ is not a symmetric distribution. A discrete time
hazard model derived from an underlying continuous time proportional hazard model can
be written in this form. See Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for an application.
16 Theoretical results exist for lack of non-parametric identification in hazard models when
one or more of the following are present: duration dependence, time varying variables, time
varying effects, and unobserved heterogeneity. For example, Baker and Melino (2000), us-
ing simulations, look at the behaviour of the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator
for a discrete duration model with unobserved heterogeneity and unknown duration effect,
and find the estimator to be biased when both are non-parametrically specified. Unsur-
prisingly, empirical researchers have also found the model estimations to be unstable when
most of the time effects are modelled in an unrestricted manner, and have thus imposed
some functional form restrictions to identify the parameters. See Ham and Rea (1987) for
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ωsf = ωef = ωsc = ωec = 0 as a normalisation, and estimate the associated probability,
p.
4 Data, sample, and variable definitions
4.1 Data and sample selection
The present study benefits from rich longitudinal Norwegian administrative data for the
period 1993 to 2011. The main data source is the Income and Wealth Statistics for Persons
and Families (Statistics Norway, 2005). The data are drawn from the annual tax returns,
and the education registers (years of education and fields of studies). The data also contain
individual and family socio-demographic characteristics. Since our focus is on wage earners
and the self-employed who have strong labour market attachment, we restrict our analysis
to Norwegian citizens aged 25 to 61, and exclude those who have reported any income from
agricultural, forestry or fishing activities.17
We use an income-based definition to identify periods or spells of self-employment and
wage employment. In our main analysis, we classify an individual observation as ‘self-
employed’ if the major source of income is self-employment income, i.e., if the reported self-
employment income (net of expenses) is larger in absolute value than the wage income, and
is also larger than government transfers (which include disability insurance, unemployment
benefits and other types of pensions).18 Additionally, we restrict our sample to those who
have been classified as either being in wage employment or self-employment during the
a discussion of these issues in the context of an empirical application.
17 Since immigrants are a group of ‘selected’ individuals, we exclude them.
18 We also exclude individuals who do not report any wage income or business income that
is larger than the “Basic amount” during the observation period for at least 3 years. The
“Basic amount” is the base for calculating many of the Norwegian social insurance scheme’s
payments and was 78,024 NOK in 2011 (the approximate exchange rate in that year was:
1 USD≡5.67 NOK; 1 EUR ≡7.79 NOK).
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observation period 1993 to 2011.19
[Figure 4 here]
The majority of individuals never experience any self-employment spells. For example,
the average rate of self-employment over the sample period is around 5%, (see Figure 4).
To reduce the computational burden of working with over 2 million individuals, we use a
50% random sample to generate our tax variables. From this sample, we next randomly
select 2% of individuals who have never been categorised as self-employed, and 20% from
the other group, which includes individuals with periods of self-employment spells only, and
individuals with a mix of types of employment. This gives us a sample of 476, 275 individual-
year unweighted observations. All analyses presented use sample weights to account for this
endogenous sample selection, following Solon, Haider and Wooldridge (2015).
4.2 Defining and estimating the tax variables
Our analysis is based on the theoretical exposition of an expected utility maximisation
approach discussed by Wen and Gordon (2014), who in turn base their model on the one
developed by Rees and Shah (1986). Assuming risk neutrality, a convex tax schedule, and
log-normally distributed pre-tax income, they show how the probability of self-employment
can be written as a function of the tax schedule using two representations of the effects of
taxation.20 These are (i) netincdiff, which is the difference in log of expected net incomes
in self-employment and wage employment; and (ii) convexity which is a measure of how the
19 Around 18% of the individuals in the sample experienced at least one ‘third-state’ spell
(periods of time that cannot be defined either as wage employment or as self-employment)
and are omitted from the analysis.
20 Wen and Gordon (2014) represent the convex tax function specifying the after-tax income
xj as (yj)
1−τy0
τ , where the tax parameters τ and y0 are such that, 0 < τ < 1, and y0 > 0
represents the income at which the tax liability is zero. (1− τ) is the elasticity of post-tax
income with respect to pre-tax income (also see Musgrave and Thin (1948) and Benabou
(2000)).
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expected tax liability changes due to the volatility of their self-employment income relative
to the net income in wage employment (see online Appendix A.1 for further details).
The construction of the two tax variables requires net-income distributions for each indi-
vidual. We use a tax simulator to generate these (see online Appendix A.2). The simulator
considers the yearly rules for taxing self-employment income net of expenses, wages, and
other sources of income. Other sources of income are taken to be exogenous; these are added
to the predicted self-employment or wage income. The simulator also accounts for the main
deductions and allowances, as well as for the system for taxation of the labour and capital
parts of net self-employment income, see Section 2.
Our construction of the two tax variables closely follows Wen and Gordon (2014). As-
suming pre-tax income to be log-normally distributed, yj ∼ LN(µj, σj), where j = s for
self-employment, and j = e for wage employment, we have,




The first tax variable, netincdiff, that enters the occupational choice probability is given by
netincdiff = [(1− τs) ln(ys)]/[(1− τe) ln(ye)] ' ln [netincomes/netincomee] (3)
where τ is a tax parameter from the tax function (see Footnote 20). For each individual,
we first estimate the selectivity-corrected expected pre-tax income (yj) for each occupation
in each time period.21 We then use the tax simulator to generate the individual specific net
incomes in both occupations: netincomes and netincomee.
Next, we define the second individual specific tax variable representation: convexity.
This variable is defined as the difference between the expected tax liability E[T (ys)], and
21 Online Appendix A.3 contains the full set of estimates from the equations that were used
to generate the income variables.
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the tax liability at the expected income T (ȳs), relative to the expected net income x̄s =
(ȳs − T (ȳs)).22 Wage employment is generally less riskier than self-employment. Hence,
following Wen and Gordon (2014), we derive our convexity variable by setting the coefficient
of variation for wage income equal to 0, so that convexity is associated with uncertainties in
self-employment income only.
The convexity variable for each individual in each time period is calculated as:
convexity =
E[T (ys)]− T (ȳs)
ȳs − T (ȳs)
. (4)
4.3 Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the main estimation sample are provided in Table 1. On average,
in the weighted sample, the proportion of individuals exiting out of a period of work and
into a period of self-employment is less than 1%, whereas the average share of exits out of a
period of self-employment is 11%. We next turn to our tax variables.
[Table 1 here]
The overall distributions of the two tax variables are provided in Figures 5 and 6. net-
incdiff is predominantly negative, indicating that, for the majority of observations in the
sample, the predicted net wage income is higher than the predicted net self-employment
22 As shown in Wen and Gordon (2014), the tax liability function T (yj) in the theoretical
model is given by yj(1 − (y0/yj)τ ). This term is strictly convex and hence the use of the
term convexity, see Wen and Gordon (2014, p. 472).
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income.23 convexity is as expected, estimated to be mostly positive.24 The average value
of predicted netincdiff of −0.448 implies that the net income in self-employment is about
64% of net income in wage employment. The average estimated value of convexity is 0.007
(s.d.= 0.008) which is lower than the convexity value of 0.011 (s.d. 0.16) reported by Wen
and Gordon (2014) for Canada.
Box-and-whisker plots in Figures 7 and 8 show how these estimated tax variables change
over time. The median netincdiff remains stable over time without experiencing a clear trend,
and the spread decreases over time. A slightly declining trend is observed for convexity which
complies with the reduced progressivity of the taxation during the sample period (Section 2).
The temporary up-tick in the median and spread of convexity in 2000 is consistent with the
fact that two surtaxes were introduced in that year, making the overall tax-schedule more
progressive.25 26
23 The paradox of self-employment being characterized by higher uncertainty and lower
earnings than wage employment is a common finding in previous studies (see for example
Hamilton (2000) and Hurst and Pugsley (2011), or Berglann et al. (2011) for the case of
Norway). There are several possible explanations for this puzzle. Among them: (i) the
relevance of unobserved non-pecuniary benefits; (ii) unobserved under-reporting of income
by the self-employed; and (iii) over-estimation by the self-employed of their probability of
success.
24 Negative convexity values are possible if the tax function is not convex. Estimated convex-
ity is 0 for about 1.5% of the observations and negative for about 5.5% of the observations.
25 Another possible explanation for this is the increased uncertainty due to the early 2000s
recession.
26 We carried out an analysis of covariance to assess the contribution of various factors to
the variation of the two tax variables. We included all the variables (sex, marital status,
education, region, kids, family-head, year dummies, two selection correction terms, and
the estimated variances), that were used in the predictions of these two tax variables along
16
[Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 here ]
In addition to the two tax variables, the models also include time-varying and time-
invariant control variables. The time-invariant variables are: sex, age at the start of the spell,
indicator variables for highest education level achieved, and regional dummies to account for
local labour market conditions. Calendar time dummies control for macro effects. The data
are an unbalanced panel, see descriptive information in Table 1. Self-employed individuals
are on average older and less educated than individuals who are paid wages, and there
is a lower proportion of females among the self-employed. Self-employment is also highly
concentrated in the more densely populated areas of Eastern Norway (the Oslo region) and
Western Norway (the Bergen region).
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Before discussing the parametric model estimation results, we provide a plot of the em-
pirical hazard in Figure 9.27 The raw data self-employment (SE ) hazard consistently lies
above the wage-employment (WE ) hazard, implying that the conditional exit rate from SE
with the other tax variable (convexity or netincdiff ). The model R-squared values were
29% and 49% respectively in the netincdiff and convexity equations. The top four largest
contributors explained 46% of the model sum-of-squares (SS) in the netincdiff equation.
These were Education, Selection into SE, and the regional and year dummies. With regard
to the convexity variable, the top four largest contributors were the year effects, education,
and the estimated heteroskedastic functions, which together explained 38% of the model
SS. The convexity (netincdiff ) variable in the netincdiff (convexity) equation explained
less than 4%(2%) of the model variations. The largest contributions to the model SS came
from the year effects.
27 This is the number of individuals exiting during the year divided by the number of
individuals in that state at the beginning of the year.
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is higher relative to an exit from WE. The WE hazard is quite low and stable over the spell
duration. The probability of exiting from SE into WE is around 0.23 in the first year of the
spell compared to 0.02 from WE into SE.
[Figure 9 here]
Our base model estimates are presented in Table 2.28 All four hazard functions are esti-
mated simultaneously. Except for the left-censored SE hazard, the other three hazards show
negative duration dependence, ceteris paribus. Insignificant duration dependence estimated
for the left-censored SE spells is consistent with the observation that the probability of exit-
ing is almost zero for high duration spells, and the sample of left-censored spells has a higher
probability of containing large-duration spells.
[Table 2 here]
We focus our discussions on the interpretation of the estimated effects of the tax variables.
The theory predicts a positive (negative) effect of the netincdiff variable on the probability
of exit from WE (SE ). For example, the higher the proportionate increase in the net-income
differential with respect to the net income from WE, the higher the exit rate from WE (Wen
and Gordon, 2014; Taylor, 1996; Fossen, 2009). On the other hand, the theoretical prediction
of the effect of convexity is negative on exit rate from WE since higher ‘convexity’ would be
expected to discourage SE. The estimated effects of the two tax variables conform to these
theoretical predictions.
These estimated coefficients are also found to be higher in absolute value for WE exit
probabilities (Columns [2] and [4]). These results suggest that, compared to exits from SE,
the probability of an exit from WE is more sensitive to changes in both expected net-income
differences and tax progressivity. This is consistent with the fact that the SE tend to continue
28 The bootstrapped standard errors to account for the tax variables being ‘generated re-
gressors’ did not change the significance of our variables compared to the usual maximum
likelihood standard errors for our base model reported in Table 2. Hence, we only report
the usual MLE standard errors in this table and subsequent tables.
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their business activities even if they experience lower earnings growth (Hamilton, 2000).
These estimates also indicate that a one percentage point increase in convexity requires
an increase of approximately 9 to 14 percentage points in netincdiff to keep these hazards
unchanged. Note that increases in convexity in this calculation are assumed to take place via
changes to the volatility of SE income (online Appendix A.1 equation (A.4)) as we assume
no uncertainty in WE income in the calculation of this variable. Similarly, the increase in
netincdiff is assumed to work either via a reduction in the pre-tax income in WE or via
an increase in the expected pre-tax SE income (not altering the variance of the SE income
distribution). To further explore these effects accounting for the relationship between the
two tax variables, we simulated a policy experiment. The results are presented below.
5.2 Results from a policy experiment
So far, we have looked at the effects of partial changes in the tax variables netincdiff
and convexity. Motivated by the analysis in Wen and Gordon (2014), to gain further un-
derstanding of how these related changes may be achieved through taxation, we consider a
hypothetical reform in the year 2000. We chose this year because the Norwegian government
introduced two changes in the taxation of gross income from wage and self-employment in
that year. The threshold for the 1999 surtax rate of 13.5% was increased from 269,100
NOK to 277,800 NOK. More importantly, an additional surtax was introduced for income
exceeding 762,700 NOK (dashed line in Figure 10). These changes increased the overall
progressivity of the Norwegian income tax system.29
[Figure 10 here]
Our policy experiment is to replace two of the surtaxes applied to personal income with
one surtax, to create a flatter tax schedule (solid line in Figure 10). The surtax value of
11% on gross income above 200, 000 NOK is chosen to ensure revenue neutrality, given a ‘no
behavioural reaction’ assumption. Other features of the taxation are held constant. New
29 According to exchange rates for 2000: 1 EUR ≡ 8.11 Norwegian kroner (NOK), and 1
USD ≡ 8.81 NOK.
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values of netincdiff and convexity were generated under the hypothetical scenario using our
tax simulator, and the transition rates predicted from the estimated models.
The average values of the netincdiff and convexity variables in our weighted sample are
−0.374 and 0.0071 under the new policy regime, compared to the original figures for the
year 2000 of −0.382 and 0.0087, respectively. As expected, the less-progressive tax schedule
leads to a decrease of 0.16 percentage points in convexity. The hypothetical policy also leads
to a small increase in the mean netincdiff, so that average ratio of net income in SE to net
income in WE changes from 68.2 % to 68.8%.
The predicted transition probabilities and the corresponding standard errors, under the
old and the new tax regimes, are reported in Table 3.30 In the benchmark year 2000, the
model predicts that around 9.33% of self-employed individuals will transit out of SE to WE
(Case [A]).31 However, the reform reduces this figure to 9.32% (Case [B]). Under the new
regime, the predicted transitions from WE to SE are higher at 0.68% compared to 0.56%
in the base model. Since a very large proportion of individuals are in WE compared to SE,
even this small increase in the exit rates out of WE can generate a substantial net inflow
into SE. The change in the exit rates induced by the policy reform is not significant for the
self-employed.
[Table 3 here]
To further explore how the model predicts responses to separate changes in the two tax
variables, we look at these effects separately. In Case [C], we hold the convexity variable fixed
at a value that is the same as in the base case scenario, and let the netincdiff variable change.
Conversely, in Case [D] there is a change in the convexity variable only. Table 3 shows that
the partial effect of a change in netincdiff is an increase in transitions out of both SE and
WE. This result is consistent with the fact that mean netincdiff experiences a decrease in
30 All predictions including the differences in predicted exit rate, and the associated standard
errors, use all four hazards. These are calculated using STATA’s margins command.
31 The observed exit rates in 2000 were 9.813% and 0.595%.
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the reform scenario for the self-employed, whereas it increases for wage earners. A possible
explanation for this effect is that the reduced progressivity of the tax system would encourage
a larger share of wage earners who expect to be successful in self-employment, to transit into
SE. On the other hand, since a majority of self-employed individuals have been predicted to
have a higher post-tax income in regular employment, a flatter tax scenario would increase
the proportion of them leaving SE for WE. In contrast, the decrease in convexity, common to
both WE and SE observations, reduces the transitions from SE and increases the exit from
WE. In summary, the hypothetical tax scenario is found to encourage the net inflow into
SE. Translating these estimates to numbers, we find that such a policy would have resulted
in an increase from 2.76% to 5.34% in the net inflow into SE.32
Finally, we briefly compare our results to the findings of Wen and Gordon (2014), given
that the same variables are used to capture the effects of taxes and uncertainty. Wen and
Gordon (2014) also simulated the effect of a flatter tax schedule in the year 2000 using
Canadian data. Their policy reform implied decreases in the average values of (i) netincdiff
and convexity from −22.5% to −23.3% (a decrease of 4%), and (ii) from 1.2% to 0.8% (a
reduction of 33%). The policy reform we considered increased the average values of netincdiff
by around 2%, and reduced the average values of convexity by 18%. From the simulated
policy reform, Wen and Gordon (2014) estimate an increase in the number of self-employed
individuals of 0.78% (5.76 to 5.80%), which is substantially below our estimate of 2.6% (our
experiment implies an increase of the self-employment share in 2001 from 4.56% to 4.68%).
One should however note that Wen and Gordon (2014) do not model transitions.
5.3 Sensitivity checks
In this sub-section we present results of some of our investigations into key assumptions
of our empirical approach. We consider the following: (i) re-definition of a self-employment
32 Since the predicted probability of exit from SE in the reform scenario is not statistically
significantly different from the base model, we use the base model predicted probability.
With the reform scenario prediction, the predicted net inflow would rise to 5.36%.
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spell; (ii) estimation based only on the inflow sample; (iii) trimming the netincdiff with
respect to extreme values; (iv) controlling for local unemployment rates; (v) including a
dummy variable for individuals receiving some unemployment insurance during the year,
and (vi) allowing for the share of capital in SE income to be non-zero. Table 4 reports the
results of these investigations. The estimated effects of the tax variables are qualitatively
unchanged. The full set of results is available in the online Appendix A.3.
[Table 4 here]
Our first investigation examines the influence of the definition of an SE spell. In our
base model we included individuals in the sample if they had at least 3 years of labour
market attachment, i.e., if the net SE income or WE is larger in absolute value than the
basic amount for at least 3 years over the years the individual is observed in data. We now
redefine the sample requiring only one year of labour market attachment. The results using
this new definition are presented in Panel [B] of Table 4. Individuals with less attachment
to the labour market would be expected to be more sensitive to changes in the tax variables,
and this is what we find when we include these individuals in the estimation sample. The
results are qualitatively similar to the results from our base case (Panel [A]). However, the
coefficient for convexity in the SE fresh spells hazard decreased substantially. Individuals
with less attachment to the labour market with low predicted SE income might be expected
to be less sensitive to the progressivity of the tax system.
The base model was estimated using both the left-censored and fresh spells. We re-
estimate our model using only the inflow sample. This reduces the total number of un-
weighted observations to 229, 036. The definition of an SE spell is the same as the one used
in our base model. The results are presented in Panel [C] of Table 4. The results are broadly
similar to our base model results. As expected, dropping those spells for which we have no
information about the length of time they had spent in a particular state prior to the sample
start, slightly increases the estimates.
The third investigation involves omitting observations with extreme predicted values for
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the variable netincdiff. As shown in Figure 5, the distribution of netincdiff exhibits some
lumpiness in the tails. To assess the effect of extreme values of netincdiff, we drop those
individuals who have at least one occupation-specific netincdiff above the top 1% or below
the 1% cut-off values.33 Since individuals with very high or low netincdiff would be expected
to be less sensitive than the others, we would expect the estimated effects of netincdiff to
be higher in absolute values. This is what we see with the results reported in Panel [D]. In
the base model (Panel[A]), we found the WE exits to be more sensitive than the SE exits
and now we see that the effect of netincdiff goes up for the WE exits without much change
for in SE exits.
The next investigation examines the influence of local labour market conditions. In the
main specification we use regional dummies to partially control for labour market condi-
tions. Perhaps a better control for local labour market conditions would be the use of local
unemployment rates. Unfortunately, such information is only available from 1996, so we
report two sets of results. In Panel [E], we substitute the regional dummies with regional
unemployment rates. In Panel [F], we re-estimate our base model using the restricted sample
of 1996 to 2011. The results are very similar to each other, and qualitatively similar to the
baseline results.34
As described in Section 4, in our base model, we drop individuals who received more in
33 To preserve a continuous series of observations, all observations belonging to an individual
are dropped if there is at least one neticdiff that is either less than the first percentile
or above the 99th percentile value for that individual resulting in a loss of more than 2%
of the sample. We lose about 9% of the observations, resulting in 432,409 observations in
our unweighted sample. The definition of a SE spell is the same as the one used in our
base model.
34 We made multiple attempts, but were unable to find significant unobserved heterogeneity
in these models with the reduced number of years. We therefore report results from the
model where we set the unobserved heterogeneity component to 0.
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social security benefits than their self-employment income or wages in any year. However, it
can be the case that individuals are unemployed for a short period and the unemployment
insurance is small enough so that the individual is still defined as a self-employed or a
wage earner. Individuals with an interruption to their work might behave differently from
individuals transiting directly from WE to SE. We therefore include a dummy variable for
those individuals who received unemployment insurance during the year. As Panel [G] shows,
the results are similar to those from the base model.
In Norway, self-employed individuals have the option of having a share of the self-
employed income declared as capital income, which is taxed at a lower rate than labour
income, as explained in Section 2. Tax variables used in our main model are generated
under the assumption that the share of capital income in total income is zero (see online
Appendix A.2). We believe our assumption is reasonable for the following reasons. First, it
is not clear what is an appropriate assumption regarding the proportion of capital income
used in the generation of counter-factual SE income distributions for the wage earners, which
are also exogenous. Second, during our sample period, the share declared as capital income
is either 0 or very small (median value is 0.037). However, we check for sensitivity by re-
generating our tax variables allowing for 3.7% of the predicted SE income to be reported as
capital income instead of 0. The results are in Panel [H]. The effect of convexity is slightly
stronger on the SE exit rates, while the rest of the estimated effects remain similar to the
base model estimates.
6 Conclusion
We look at the effect of taxation on self-employment and wage employment durations.
Our work complements the existing literature on many dimensions. First, in contrast to
many existing studies, our definitions of self-employment and wage employment are based
on income reported in Norwegian tax returns. The rest of the variables used come from
various other registry data. Norwegian registry data are considered to be exceptional in
terms of coverage and reliability (Blundell, Graber and Mogstad, 2015). Second, we look
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at the evolution of self-employment and wage employment spells over a very long period,
from 1993 to 2011. We model these transitions using a two-state multi-spell duration model
allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity, and controlling for a rich set of socio-
demographic characteristics.
We focus on the effects of two tax variables: netincdiff and convexity, obtained from Wen
and Gordon (2014). netincdiff is defined as the difference in log net-of-tax income in the two
occupations, and convexity is an individual-specific measure that captures the interaction
between the progressivity of the tax schedule and the volatility of self-employment income
relative to wage income. We use the model to predict the transitions under a simulated tax
regime that reduced the progressivity of the tax schedule in the year 2000. We also provide
some sensitivity checks with respect to the definition of self-employment, the selection of
the estimation sample, etc. The estimated effects of our two tax variables of interest are
qualitatively unchanged, and the quantitative differences are as expected.
The main finding is that, as predicted by theory, higher expected net earnings in self-
employment relative to wage employment reduces the probability of exiting out of a self-
employment spell. The entry into self-employment - or equivalently the exit out of wage
employment - is found to be more sensitive to changes in the two variables than exit from
self-employment. In our base model, the estimated effect of changes to netincdiff that are
required when convexity changes by a percentage point, to encourage self-employment, is
about 9 to 14 times larger in percentage point terms. To shed further light on this, we
carried out a policy experiment by implementing a flatter tax schedule in the year 2000 that
resulted in reduced tax progressivity. The hypothetical scenario was found to encourage
entry into self-employment but not significantly the exit from self-employment, with the
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Table 1: Summary statistics - mean (std deviation)
All WE Sample SE Sample
Individual-specific variables
Females 0.47 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.27 (0.44)
Lower secondary school and less 0.39 (0.49) 0.35 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50)
Upper secondary school 0.30 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.27 (0.45)
University 0.32 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 0.20 (0.40)
Time-varying variables
Age at the start of the spell 35.06 (9.24) 34.84 (9.20) 39.80 (8.80)
Years 1993-1998 0.30 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.34 (0.47)
Years 1999-2002 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41)
Years 2003-2007 0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44)
Years 2008-2011 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.18 (0.39)
Eastern Norway 0.50 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50)
Southern Norway 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.24)
West Norway 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.24 (0.42)
Central Norway 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.26)
Northern Norway 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.27)
Local Unemployment Rate 2.73 (0.83) 2.73 (0.83) 2.78 (0.83)
convexity 0.007 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 0.012 (0.008)
netincdiff -0.448 (0.19) -0.429 (0.17) -0.825 (0.25)
Proportion of exits from 0.006 0.106
Notes: (i) Years covered in the analysis are 1993-2011. (ii) Definitions of wage em-
ployment and self-employment and the sample selection criteria used are provided
in Section 4. (iii) All averages and proportions are based on the weighted sample
(see Section 4 for further details). (iv) The number of unweighted observations
is 476,275, of which 362,217 are classified as wage employment, and 114,058 as
self-employment. (v) The number of unweighted individuals is 34,746.
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Table 2: Hazard model estimates, main sample
Fresh spells Left censored spells
SE WE SE WE
[1] [2] [3] [4]
netincdiff −0.429 1.685 −0.725 1.753
(0.053) (0.082) (0.109) (0.087)
convexity*100 0.049 −0.246 −0.017 −0.163
(0.015) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023)
Male −0.024 0.602 0.191 0.776
(0.027) (0.030) (0.058) (0.037)
Age at the start of the spell −0.012 0.030 −0.034 −0.046
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High School −0.006 0.115 −0.131 −0.008
(0.029) (0.035) (0.048) (0.038)
University 0.220 0.131 0.051 0.100
(0.028) (0.037) (0.051) (0.038)
ln(duration) −0.520 −0.490 −0.016 −0.234
(0.016) (0.018) (0.037) (0.032)
Constant −1.135 −3.11 −0.892 −1.930
(0.092) (0.103) (0.192) (0.118)
Support points −0.531 −3.042 −1.337 −1.839
(0.049) (0.200) (0.072) (0.094)
Probability masses
p1 (constants + support points) 0.805
(0.019)
p2 (constants only) 0.195
(0.019)
N obs (unweighted) 476,275
N individuals (unweighted) 34,746
Maximised log likelihood value -105687.67
Notes: (i) MLE standard errors in parentheses; (ii) The models are estimated using
a random sample of individuals as detailed in Section 4 of the paper; (iii) Omitted
education category is no-education/high-school drop-out. (iv) The model additionally
includes region and time indicators, see Table 1. Complete sets of results are available
in the online Appendix A.4. 31
Table 3: Average predicted exit probabilities (%) under the tax reform scenario
Case Tax scenario Probability of exit
fromSE, % fromWE, %
[A] Base model: year 2000, two surtaxes 9.334 0.562
(s.e) (0.227) (0.011)
[B] Reform Scenario: year 2000, one surtax 9.316 0.682
(s.e) (0.289) (0.016)
Change [A]- [B] 0.018 -0.119
(s.e) (0.184) (0.010)
Sample size in year 2000 6,043 130,019
[C] convexity: unchanged from baseline
netincdiff: reform 9.622 0.571
(s.e) (0.234) (0.011)
[D] netincdiff: unchanged from baseline
convexity: reform 9.034 0.673
(s.e) (0.276) (0.015)
Notes: (i) Actual exit rates in 2000 were 9.813% and 0.595%. (ii) Predicted ex-
its are based on the estimated model from Table 2. (iii) The percentage exits are
calculated with respect to the stocks in each of the occupational categories. (iv)
Case [A] refers to the actual situation as it was in year 2000 with two surtaxes;
Calculated convexity and netincdiff in this scenario were used in the estimation
of the main model. (v) Case [B] refers to a hypothetical reform scenario that
replaces two surtaxes with just one surtax. New values of convexity and net-
incdiff are recalculated given the new tax rules. (vi) Case [C] considers values
of convexity from the baseline scenario and values of netincdiff from the reform
scenario. (vii) Case [D] considers values of netincdiff from the baseline scenario
and values of convexity from the reform scenario. (viii) The above predictions
and the associated standard errors were calculated using the delta method in
STATA’s command margins. Average exit rates as well as the differenced aver-
age exit rates were all calculated using all four hazards. (ix) All calculations are
based on the weighted sample.
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Table 4: Sensitivity checks: Hazard model estimates
Fresh spells Left-censored spells
SE WE SE WE
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
[A] - Base case
netincdiff -0.429 1.685 -0.725 1.753
(0.053) (0.082) (0.109) (0.087)
convexity*100 0.049 -0.246 -0.017 -0.163
(0.015) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023)
[B] - Changes to sample definition
netincdiff -0.493 1.734 -0.615 1.768
(0.016) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028)
convexity*100 0.011 -0.277 0.016 -0.187
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)





[D] - Using trimmed netincdiff
netincdiff -0.333 2.281 -0.871 2.998
(0.068) (0.108) (0.138) (0.134)
convexity*100 0.065 -0.222 -0.061 -0.237
(0.017) (0.025) (0.032) (0.026)
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[E] - Including regional unemployment rate 1996-2011
netincdiff -0.531 1.709 -0.718 1.568
(0.057) (0.096) (0.110) (0.083)
convexity*100 0.045 -0.292 0.047 -0.115
(0.018) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025)
[F] - Including regional dummies 1996-2011
netincdiff -0.519 1.762 -0.754 1.607
(0.057) (0.095) (0.110) (0.081)
convexity*100 0.036 -0.314 0.038 -0.140
(0.018) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024)
[G] - Including unemployment benefits dummy
netincdiff -0.415 1.698 -0.694 1.763
(0.053) (0.082) (0.109) (0.087)
convexity*100 0.049 -0.252 -0.014 -0.165
(0.015) (0.022) (0.030) (0.023)
[H] - Using 3.7% capital income invested in SE
netincdiff -0.434 1.712 -0.719 1.761
(0.052) (0.083) (0.108) (0.086)
convexity*100 0.058 -0.264 -0.008 -0.166
(0.016) (0.024) (0.031) (0.025)
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parenthesis. (ii) See Section 5.3 for further details; (iii) Panels
[E] and [F] report results with no unobserved heterogeneity (see footnote 34); (iv) Also see
notes to Table 2. (v) Full set of results are available in the online Appendix A.3.
34
Figures


















0 200 400 600 800 1000
Thousands of 2005 NOK 
Wage Income Self Employment Income
Notes : (i) Solid line: Marginal tax rate for a wage earner in tax class 1 (see online Appendix
A.2 for the definition of tax class 1) with only wage income. Employer’s social security
contributions are excluded (ii) Dashed line: Marginal tax rate for a self-employed individual
in tax class 1 with only self-employed income, and no capital invested in the firm.
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1995 2005
2010
Notes :(i) Marginal tax rate for a wage earner in tax class 1 with only wage income in year
1995, 2005 and 2010. Employer’s social security contributions are excluded. Thresholds
are adjusted to account for income growth during the period (base year is 2005). Marginal
tax rate is reported only for income larger than 200,000 NOK. (ii) To improve readability,
the case for self-employment income is not reported, as it would only imply a proportional
vertical shift of each of the three curves presented, see Figure 1.
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Notes : (i) Average tax rate for a wage earner in tax class 1 with only wage income in year
1995, 2005 and 2010. Employer’s social security contribution are excluded. Thresholds are
adjusted to account for income growth during the period (base year is 2005). (ii) To improve
readability, the case for self-employment income is not reported, as it would only imply a
proportional vertical shift of each of the three curves presented, see Figure 1.
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1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Notes : Annual self-employment observation as a share of total self-employment + wage
employment observations. Categorisation into self-employment and wage employment is
described in Section 3.
38
Figure 5: Density of netincdiff
Notes : netincdiff distribution across all years and observations. netincdiff is defined in
Section 4.2.
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Figure 6: Density of convexity
Notes : convexity distribution across all years and observations. convexity defined in equation
(4).
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Notes : (i) netincdiff=ln[net income in SE/net income in WE ]. See Section 4.2 for further
details. (ii)The box shows the median and the inter-quartile range (IQR). 1.5 times IQR is
given by the end of the whiskers.
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Notes : (i) See equation (4) for the definition of convexity. (ii)The box shows the median and
the inter-quartile range (IQR). 1.5 times IQR is given by the end of the whiskers.
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Duration in Years
Wage-Employment Hazard Self-Employment Hazard
Notes : The figure presents the non-parametric hazard estimates for wage employment and
self-employment spells. These are the OLS estimated coefficients on the duration time dum-
mies in a linear regression of the duration variable. The duration variable takes the value of
0 if that particular year refers to an on-going spell and 1 when it is associated with an exit.
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0 200 400 600 800 1000
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2000 reform 2000 baseline
Notes :(i) Bold line: Marginal tax rate for a wage earner in tax class 1 (see online Appendix
A.2) with only wage income in year 2000. Employer’s social security contributions are
excluded. (ii) Dashed line: year 2000 tax experiment. The two surtaxes are replaced by a
single surtax of 11% for gross incomes exceeding 200,000 NOK. (iii) To improve readability,
the case for self-employment income is not reported, as it would only imply a proportional
vertical shift of each marginal tax curve presented, see Figure 1.
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